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DEEDS - EFFECT OF NONCOMPLIANCE WITH STATUTE REQUIRING
GRANTOR TO SET FORTH IN DEED NAME UNDER WHICH HE DERIVED
TITLE - In a suit between plaintiff and defendant Girola Bros., plaintiff obtained a. judgment and levied upon certain property. Plaintiff purchased the
land at an execution sale and recorded the sheriff's deed conveying the
property to him. Prior to the commencement of the action, defendant Girola
Bros. had changed its name to Madalay, -Inc., and under the latter name had
conveyed the property, subsequently levied on by plaintiff, to defendant M. Girola,
pending the action by plaintiff. This deed was recorded. ~t set forth Madalay,
Inc., as grantor, but failed to set forth the name in which Madalay, Inc., derived title to the realty as required by section 1096 of the Civil Code of California.1 The plaintiff brought this action to quiet title to the land, claiming
the prior conveyance to defendant M. Girola was void because it fajled to
comply with section 1096. The contention of the defendants was that a
conveyance in disregard of the statute could be attacked only by a subsequent
purchaser for value without notice of the change of name by the original owner.
Held, because of noncompliance with the statute, the deed from Madalay, Inc.,
to M. Girola was inoperative to pass legal title; property remained in the
grantor and was subject to plaintiff's levy of execution, title passing to him by
virtue of the sheriff's sale and deed. Puccetti 'ti; Girola, 20 Cal. (2d) 574, 128 P.
(2d) 13 (1942).2
The common-law rule is that the real owner of property may make a valid
conveyance of it under any name he may care to assume. 8 The question. in
the principal case is to what extent the statute changed that rule. In holding
that it abrogates the common-law rule, the court said, "Its language is mandatory and nowhere suggests that compliance is excused when a subsequent
purchaser has notice of the change in name." 4 This interpretation, that title
does not pass as between grantor and grantee due to the failure to set forth the
name in which the grantor received title, is debatable. Another possible interpretation is that the purpose of such a statutory provision is to protect a subsequent grantee from the grantor who has previously conveyed the property under
1 Cal. Civ. Code (Deering, 1941), § 1096, provides: "Any person in whom the
title of real estate is vested, who shall afterwards, from any cause, have his or her
name changed, must in any conveyance of said real estate so held, set forth the name
in which he or she derived title to said real estate."
2 Also noted 3 l CAL. L. REv. IOO ( l 942).
8 l DEVLIN, LAW OF DEEDS, 2d ed., § 188 (1897); BREWSTER, CoNVEYANCING, § 43 (1904); PATTON, LAND TITLES, § 183 (1938); David v. Williamsburgh City Fire Ins. Co., 83 N. Y. 265 (1880); Blackman v. Henderson, II6 Iowa
578, 87 N. W. 655 (1901); Klorfine v. Cole, 121 Ore. 76 at 85, 252 P. 708, 254
P. 200 (1927). In Fallon v. Kehoe, 38 Cal. 44 (1869), the grantor in his true
name conveyed property which he had received title to under a nickname. In holding
the conveyance was valid as against a subsequent grantee to whom the property was
allegedly conveyed under the nickname, the court stated, 38 Cal. at 48-49, "We apprehend there can be but little doubt on this point, and we do not understand counsel
as controverting the proposition, that, if the true owner conveys property by any name,
the conveyance, as between the grantor and grantee, will transfer the title."
4 Principal case, 128 P. (2d) at 15.
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another name. Accordingly, if such a grantee actually knows of the change
in the grantor's name, the grantee may search the record for conveyances by
the grantor in either name. Such was the position of the plaintiff in this case.
Since he was aware of the grantor's change in name, the failure of the grantor
to comply with the statute logically should make no difference. This suggested
interpretation would be comparable to that which the courts have generally
given the recording statutes. 5 To support its conclusion that the provision of
section rn96 is mandatory and that compliance is not excused when the subsequent purchaser has notice of the change in name, the court pointed out that
this section is not found among those under "Effect of Recording or Want
Thereof" but rather that it is found under "Mode of Transfer" and that the
provisions of this article have been interpreted as mandatory. 6 Two cases arising
under one of these provisions, section 1095, were cited as an example, but an
examination of them shows that this section was merely a statement of the rule
prevailing prior to its enactment. 7 The conclusion does not necessarily follow
that section rn96 was meant as a mandatory provision too, when it is considered
that to treat it as such is to abrogate the common-law rule on this point. This
suggests that section 1095 and section rn96 perhaps merit different treatment.
As the court points out, section 1096 was originally enacted following a suggestion of the court in Fallon v. Kehoe,8 a case involving two conveyances of
the same land by the grantor under different names. The court decided that
the recording of the first deed was notice to subsequent purchasers, under the
California law as it then stood. It is worthwhile to note that the court in that
5
3 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY, 3d ed., § 1262 (1939): "The requirement of
record has almost invariably been regarded as intended for the protection of subsequent
purchasers only, so that a failure to record the instrument in no way affects the passing
of title as between the parties thereto." See also cases there cited. In Bird v. Dennison, 7 Cal. 297 ( l 8 57), the court said that the pu~pose of the recording acts is to give
notice to subsequent purchasers, and that an unrecorded deed is good as between the
parties. See also, Hunter v. Watson, 12 Cal. 363 (1859); Beattie v. Crewdson, 124
Cal. 577, 57 P. 463 (1899).
6
See Cal. Civ. Code (Deering, 1941), part II, c. 4, art. 4, "Effect of Recording
or of the Want Thereof," and part II, c. 2, art. 1, "Mode of Transfer."
1 Cal. Civ. Code (Deering, 1941), § 1095 provides: "When an attorney in fact
executes an instrument transferring -an estate in real property, he must subscribe the
name of his principal to it, and his own name as attorney in fact." This provision was
enacted in 1872. In Mitchell v. Benjamin Franklin Bond & Indemnity Corp., 13
Cal. App. (2d) 447, 57 P. (2d) 185 (1936), cited in the principal case, the court
held that a deed in the name of the attorney in fact does not pass the principal's title
to the property described in the deed, even if "attorney for [ a named principal]" is
added to the signature. In that case the court, after merely citing § 1095, Morrison
v. Bowman, 29 Cal. 337 (1865) (the second case so cited by the court in the principal
case), and Echols v. Cheney, 28 Cal. 157 (1865), said, 13 Cal. App. (2d) at 448,
"The law is well settled that a deed in the name of an attorney in fact, even if to the
signature is added the words 'attorney for (a named principal),' does not pass the
principal's title to the property described in such deed." The two cases decided in
1865, prior to the enactment of § 1095, show that the same rule prevailed then as
after the enactment.
8
38 Cal. 44 (1869).
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case says, "It would have been better, perhaps, if the statute had contained a
provision to the e:ffect that when the owner of land conveys it by a different
name from that in which he acquired it, the deed should contain a proper reference to that fact, for the security of subsequent purchasers or incumbrancers.
. • • I£ the statute provided that if the land be conveyed by a different name
from that in which the granter acquired it, the record of the deed should not
impart notice to subsequent purchasers or incumbrancers, unless it contained
proper recit_als, showing why the deed is made in a different name, the difficulty
would be completely remedied." 9 The emphasis is placed upon the effect of
giving notice to subsequent purchasers by compliance with the as then only
proposed statute. It would seem that such an interpretation of section 1096
would be reasonable. Hence, as to a third party with notice of the grantor's
change of name, title would be in the grantee even though the grantor failed
to comply with the statute. This interpretation, as pointed out, would be
consistent with that of the recording acts, and likewise with that of other statutory requirements relating to the mode of transferring title.10
Mary Jane Morris

Id. at 50-51.
PATroN, LAND TITLES, § 200 (1938): "But the weight of authority is that
the purpose of such statutes [requiring witnesses] is merely to entitle the instrument
to be recorded, and that, though compliance therewith is essential to a valid record •••
a failure to comply with the statute does not change the common-law rule that a deed
without witnesses is good as between the parties •• ·• and parties having notice of it."
See Parret v. Shaubhut, 5 Minn. 323 (1860).
9
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